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Plumb: Constitutional Law - Expansion of National Power under the Proper

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Expansion of National Power Under the Property
Clause: Federal Regulation of Wildlife. Kleppe v. New Mexico,
U.S.

,96

S.Ct. 2285 (1976).

The New Mexico Livestock Board, pursuant to the New
Mexico Estray Law,' rounded up and removed nineteen unbranded and unclaimed burros on public lands. The burros
were then sold at a public auction. After the sale, the Bureau
of Land Management asserted the right to possession of the
burros under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros
Act 2 and demanded that the burros be returned to the public
lands. The State of New Mexico, the Livestock Board and its
director, and the purchaser of three of the burros sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the Wild
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act was unconstitutional.
A three-judge district court' held that the Act unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The United States
Supreme Court, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,4 reversed and unanimously held that, as applied to this case, the Act is constitutional because the property clause' gives Congress the
power to protect and regulate wildlife on public lands, state
law notwithstanding.'
In addition to defining the current scope of federal control over wildlife, the decision in Kleppe v. New Mexico has
broad implications for determining the expansive bounds of
Congressional power under the property clause and reciprocal state legislative power over public lands and adjoining
private lands. A brief history of federal legislation protecting wild horses and burros, the extent of Congressional power
to regulate wildlife under the property clause and the ramifications of the Kleppe v. New Mexico decision are the subjects of this note.
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming.

1. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 et seq. (Repl. 1966).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (Supp. IV, 1975).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970); A court of three judges is required in hearing
an application for an injunction restraining the execution of an act of
Congress for repugnance to the Constitution.
4. Kleppe v. New Mexico, -- U.S. __ 96 S.Ct. 2285 (1976).
5. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3; "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States."
6. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2295.
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BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGISLATION PROTECTING
WILD HORSES AND BURROS

The passage of federal legislation protecting wild horses
and burros was the result, in part, of public outrage at the
ruthless and extensive practice of capturing and slaughtering
wild horses for use in commercial products.7 From 1900 to
1950, the number of wild horses had been reduced from approximately two million to 25,000.8 The number of wild
burros had also decreased since claims of overpopulation and
competition with other feral animals resulted in systematic
extermination programs.'
In 1959, the Wild Horse Annie Law"0 was passed which
prohibited the capturing of wild horses and burros on United
States land by use of airplanes and mechanized vehicles.
With the most expedient method of roundup outlawed, hunters were no longer able to capture wild animals in such large
quantities. However, capture by horseback, depletion of
watering holes and limitation of grazing areas by fencing
still threatened wild horses and their habitat. 1
Local officials had the responsibility of enforcing the
Wild Horse Annie Law. Frequently this enforcement was
half-hearted because of the strong influence of vested-interest
groups on behalf of game animals and domestic livestock inhabiting the same areas as wild horses and burros. 2 Public
interest and concern continued to grow along with the recognition that a federal program of management and control was
7. Johnston, The Fight to Save a Memory, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (1972).
8. Id. at 1055; Wyman, THE WILD HORSE OF THE WEST (1945); McKnight,
The Feral Horse in Anglo-America, 49 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 506 (1959).
9. Johnston, supra note 7, at 1055-56. The primary method of roundup was
by low-flying airplanes which drive thousands of wild animals from their
shelters to the open country. Horses were often shot from the air, usually
not fatally since a slaughterhouse requirement was that the animals be
ambulatory. The chase was continued by fast trucks with ropers lassoing
the injured and exhausted animals. The horses were then tightly packed
into trucks and transported to processing centers. Colts, because they
weighed less, were frequently left behind, falling prey to starvation or
predators.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 47 (1970).
11. Johnston, supra note 7, at 1059.
12. Id. at 1059.
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essential to provide genuine protection of these wild animals. 8
In 1971, the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
was enacted to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed horses
and burros on public lands of the United States" from "capture, branding, harassment, or death."' 4 According to the
Act, all such animals on the public lands are to be administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau
of Land Management or by the Secretary of Agriculture
through the Forest Service. 5
The Act prohibits indiscriminate reduction programs, but
humane destruction of old, sick, or lame animals may be allowed if an area is overpopulated. 6 Additional excess animals may be removed for private maintenance under humane
conditions and care.' 7 The remains of deceased wild horses
and burros may not be sold for any consideration, directly or
indirectly, nor can they be processed into commercial products.1" Although the constitutionality of the Act in all of
its conceivable applications has not yet been determined, the
American wild horses and burros have been afforded a measure of protection never known before.19
THE EXTENT OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF WILDLIFE
UNDER THE PROPERTY CLAUSE

In formulating the Act, Congress apparently intended
to invoke the property clause by stating that wild horses and
burros "are to be considered in the area where presently
found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public
13. Id. at 1060.

14.
15.
16.
17.

16
16
16
16

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 1331-32 (Supp. IV, 1975).
§ 1332-33(a) (Supp. IV, 1975).
§ 1333(b) (Supp. IV, 1915).
§ 1333(b) (Supp. IV, 1975). The Bureau of Land Management

has published pamphlets and booklets detailing the procedure for adopting
a wild horse or burro. The applicant must sign a cooperative agreement
and promise to abide by certain conditions to gain custody of the animal.
The federal government remains as legal guardian and periodically the
animals are checked in their "foster" homes to assure humane treatment
and adequacy of facilities. As of May 12, 1976, there were more than
700 horses in "foster" homes, scattered from New York to California.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (Supp. IV, 1975).
19. Johnston, supra note 7. at 1062.
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lands."2 The animals are to be federally protected and managed as components of the lands "in a manner that is designed
to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance
on public lands."'" To view, in proper perspective, the Supreme Court's recent decision unanimously upholding the
constitutionality of such language, it is necessary to consider
the historical evolution of federal regulation of wildlife under
the property clause.
The Supreme Court examined the history of the power
to control wild animals in Geer v. Connecticut' and concluded
that the control of ferae ucturae was vested by the English
Crown in the colonial governments. This power passed to
the states insofar as its exercise was not incompatible with
the rights of federal government under the Constitution.
From this basis, the rule developed that each state, in
its sovereign capacity, owned the wildlife within its borders. 4
The Supreme Court later commented that state ownership
was a "fiction" expressive in legal shorthand of the power
of a state to preserve and regulate an important resource.'
However, the doctrine has not been completely laid to rest
as some modern decisions have recognized the right of
state control under the ownership theory." Yet, even
without applying the state ownership doctrine, states have
been permitted broad control over wildlife within state lines
as an exercise of their police power-the general power to
pass laws for the welfare of the people of the state.27
The states' degree of dominion has not been absolute,
however, as the Court has held that a state's authority to reg16 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV, 1975).
16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (Supp. IV, 1975).
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
Id. at 528.
Lacoste v. Dep't. of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1924).
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948). In Kleppe v. New Mexico,
supra note 4, at 2290 n.8, the Court noted that the Secretary made no
claim that the United States owned the wild horses and burros found on
public lands and the Court did not discuss the ownership issue, choosing,
rather, to decide the case on other grounds.
26. Leger v. Louisiana Dep't. of Wildlife and Fisheries, 306 So.2d 391, 394
(La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 310 So.2d 640 (La. 1975).
27. Comment, Regulation of Wildlife in National Park System: Federal or
State?, 12 NATURAL RESOURCcS J. 627, 629 (1972).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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ulate wildlife is not exclusive of paramount powers.- Historically, the exercise of these paramount powers, in the form
of federal authority to regulate wildlife under the property
clause, has been permitted only where damage to public lands
was at issue. In Hunt v. United States, the Court upheld the
government's authority to thin overpopulated herds of deer
that were damaging foliage on federal forest land.2" This
authority was extended in New Mexico State Game Comm'n.
v. Udall" which appeared to illustrate the new limit of federal
control of wildlife under the property clause. In this case,
federal officials instituted a program of killing deer in Carlsbad Caverns National Park for a research study. The officials were then enjoined from continuing the program unless they complied with state law."' On appeal, the decision
was reversed," the district court holding that since the results
of the study were to be used later to implement programs for
preventing depredation of public lands, the Secretary of the
Interior was acting within his authority in having the deer
killed. 8
On the basis of these decisions, the district court in New
Mexico interpreted the property clause as only permitting
Congress to pass legislation to protect the public lands from
damage of some kind." Therefore, since the Act was primarily aimed at protecting wild horses and burros, and not
the land on which they lived, the court held that the Act could
not be sustained as a Congressional exercise under the property clause.8" The Supreme Court rejected this narrow reading of the property clause and held that the complete power
of Congress to make "needful" regulation "respecting" public
lands necessarily includes the power to protect the wildlife
living there.8 The Court noted that damage to federal land
28. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
29. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 100 (1928).
30. New Mexico State Game Comm'n. v. dall, 281 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1968),
rev'd., 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.), motion for leave to file petition for writ
of nandamus denied, 396 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969).
31. Id., 281 F. Supp. 627.
32. Id., 410 F.2d 1197.
33. Id. at 1201.
34. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd. sub
non. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4.
35. Id., 406 F. Supp. 1239.
86. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4 at 2292.
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is a sufficient but not necessary basis for permitting regulation under the property clause."7 Thus, in Kleppe v. New
Mexico, federal control over wildlife on public lands was permitted without a showing that such regulation was specifically needed to protect federal land."
POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE

Kleppe v.

New Mexico DECISION
The possible ramifications of the Kleppe v. New Mexico
decision are considerable since the federal government owns
a third of the total land area of the United States, and most of
the land in several western states.39
The decision should not directly affect acquired lands
over which Congress may have exclusive or partial jurisdiction by virtue of state consent or cession.4" Rather, the property clause and the Court's decision apply directly to public
domain lands over which the government has paramount but
The public lands consist prinot exclusive jurisdiction."
marily of Bureau of Land Management areas and federal
forest lands.4 2 The extent to which Congress can use the
property clause to enact general welfare laws applying to
these lands appears to be almost boundless. The Court has
held that "[t] he United States can prohibit absolutely or fix
the terms on which its property may be used."4 " The Court
later noted that "[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations."44
37. Id., at 2290.
38. Id.

39.

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 203 (96th ed. 1975) ; Of the United States land area, 33.5%
is the property of the federal government. This includes 96.4% of the land
area of Alaska, 86.5% of Nevada, 66.2% of Utah, 63.7% of Idaho, 52.3%
Oregon, 48% of Wyoming, 45% of California, and 43.9% of Arizona.
U.S. CONST. art, 1, § 8. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2293,
the Court noted that Congress' derivative legislative powers were not involved in this case and had nothing to do with Congress' powers under the
property clause.
U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2292,
the Court remarked that under the property clause, Congress exercises the
powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 156 (1976); Of the 704,749,883.4
acres of public domain lands, 471,631,492 acres consist of Bureau of Land
Management areas, and 160,242,696.7 acres consist of federal forest lands.
United States v. Light, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911).
United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
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In Kleppe, the Court approved broad Congressional
power to regulate public lands 5 and extended the scope of the
property clause one step further to include protecting the
wildlife thereon." The immediate surface result of the
Court's decision will be to seriously affect the viability of state
estray laws and provisions thereof. The Court has ruled that,
though the Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over public lands, it overrides state estray laws insofar
as they attempt to regulate federally protected animals.'
The Court acknowledged the power of states to retain jurisdiction over federal lands within state territory but noted
that under the supremacy clause 8 federal legislation under
the property clause necessarily overrides conflicting state
laws.'
No longer may state or county livestock inspectors
send estray horses and burros captured on federal land to
public markets" nor may permits be issued to round up unclaimed horses on federal lands. "1
The act protects wild horses and burros on both public
and private lands,5" but the Supreme Court in its recent decision held only that the Act, as it applies to animals taken
from public lands, was constitutional and left undetermined
the extent, if any, to which the property clause empowers
Congress to protect animals on private lands.
The Court
noted, however, that under some circumstances, regulations
under the property clause may have some effect on private
lands not otherwise under federal control. 4 This appears
45. Kleppe v. New Mexico, eupra note 4, at 2291.
46. Id., at 2292, 2295.
47. Id., at 2294.
48. U.S. CONST. art. 6.
49. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2293.
50. WYO. STAT. § 11-500 (Supp. 1975); "The inspector shall order the estray
animal sent to the most feasible convenient public market designated by
the inspector, and there to be sold." This provision and numerous other
similar state provisions, as they pertain to wild horses and burros captured
on public lands, are now nullities. The validity of the provision, as it pertains to wild horses and burros captured on private land is questionable.
51. WYO. STAT. § 11.503 (Supp. 1975) requires written permission "from the
person, persons, organization or corporation who has ownership or control of
the surface rights of the range whereon the unclaimed horses are to be
gathered or rounded up." While it is clear that estray horses may not be
rounded up on federal land, it is likely that this provision, as it pertains
to the issuance of round-up permits based on the consent of private land
owners, will also be voided by future Court decision.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. IV, 1975).
53. Kleppe v. New Mexico, aupra note 4, at 2295.
." Id.
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to be true with respect to activities which directly affect
public lands, such as the erection of a fence which encloses
federal acreage, 5 or activities which imperil public lands,
such as the building of fire near a national forest."
In the future, the Court may hold that federal regulation
over wild horses and burros normally occupying public lands
as their habitat does not cease during the occasional wanderings of the animals on state and private land. If the Court
should extend this protection to animals infrequently grazing
on public land, the next question is whether the Act57 "will
be read to provide federal jurisdiction over every wild horse
or burro that at any time sets foot upon federal land."58 The
Court's resolution of these issues will be significant in determining the bounds of Congressional power to regulate wildlife
under the property clause."'
The full scope of federal control over wildlife is already
considerable since, in addition to utilizing the property
clause, Congress has also enacted wildlife legislation under
other enumerated powers. Migratory birds"0 and endangered
species 1 have been protected by the government under its
treaty-making power,"2 and marine animals 3 have been protected under the commerce clause."
In some areas, Congress has chosen not to supersede
state jurisdiction. In establishing the National Wildlife
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.

Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1897).
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927).
166 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. IV, 1975).
Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2295.
Id. at 2291.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. IV, 1975),
amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1970). The constitutionality of the original
enactment was upheld in Missouri v. Holland, sup-ra note 28, at 420.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (Supp. IV, 1975).
Congress also enacted the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-68c
(Supp. IV, 1975), amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-68d (1970) which prohibits
the killing or sale of bald and golden eagles. It is not readily apparent upon
which basis of Congressional power the Act was enacted since the statutory language contains no express reference to the property clause, commerce clause, or treaty-making provision. Neither has there been a judicial interpretation of the underlying Congressional power since the states
have not challenged the constitutionality of this statute.
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-407 (Supp. IV,
1975).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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Refuge System, Congress provided that the authority of the
states to control fish and resident wildlife in the system
would not be affected. 5 However, state control over various
game animals might be seriously undermined by the implications of the Kleppe v. New Mexico decision. In Kleppe, the
property clause was invoked because Congress found the
wild horses and burros to be "an integral part of the natural
system of the public lands."6 Since the constitutionality of
such a finding has now been unanimously upheld, it is conceivable that in the future Congress might find that elk, deer,
and other game animals are an integral part of the natural
system of public lands and a federal statute regulating their
management on public and adjoining private lands will be enacted, thus superseding all relevant conflicting state statutes.
Interior Secretary Kleppe has assured various Fish and Game
Commissioners that it is not the Department of Interior's
intent to ask Congress for legislation regulating wildlife
species and game animals on public lands.6 ' However, Kleppe
noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision makes it clear
that Congress does have the power to delegate wildlife functions on public lands to federal agencies."
Thus, the possibility exists of erosion of states' control
over hunting and fishing within their borders. The wisdom
of such a course of action is questionable since wildlife found
in the several states is characterized by such diversity that a
rational system of regulation could not be formulated by a
single federal body. It would not be reasonable to assume that
Congress could enact legislation well-suited to the regulation
of the fish of the New England streams, the reptiles of the
southern swamps, the predators of the midwestern plains,
and the big game of the Rocky Mountains.
A further ramification of Kleppe is the possible expansion of federal control in areas other than wildlife regulation.
The scope of this possible expansion is indeterminable since
65. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c) (Supp. IV, 1975).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV, 1975).
67. Associated Press News Release, July 27, 1976; Remarks made by Secretary
of the Interior, Thomas Kleppe, to the 56th annual conference of the Western Association of Fish and Game Commissioners in Sun Valley. Idaho.
68. Id
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the Court noted that "the furthest reaches of the power granted by the property clause have not yet been definitively resolved."69 However, it is significant that the Court held that
the property clause must be given an expansive reading."
In discussing the permissible reaches of the property
clause, the Court, in Kleppe, reaffirmed the power of Congress to control the occupancy and use of public lands, to protect the lands from damage, and to prescribe the conditions
upon which others may obtain rights in them."' In these
areas, the Kleppe decision represents no change from prior
constitutional law. The primary significance of Kleppe,
for predicting the future scope of the property clause, is
the Court's conclusion that federal legislative power is not
confined solely to the enactment of land regulatory measures. 72 This determination can have far-reaching effects
when coupled with the Court's approval of federal regulation
of activities on private lands under certain circumstances."
The Court has held that states may prescribe police regulations applicable to public lands if they are not inconsistent
with federal law.7' However, where Congress chooses to act,
all conflicting state regulations pertaining to public lands
are invalid, even where the federal statutes are exercises of
police power traditionally reserved to the states. 5 The Kleppe
decision, permitting federal regulation of wildlife on public
lands, indicates the Court's approval of increased federal
power under the property clause to enact police regulations
by declaring a relationship between the subject matter of the
legislation and the system of public lands.
If the outer limit of the current constitutional test of
federal control under the property clause is whether there is
a conceivable connection between the subject matter of the
law and the public lands and whether actions on private lands
69. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2291.
70. Id. at 2290, 2292.
71. Id. at 2292, citing Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,
405 (1917).
q2. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 4, at 2292.
73. Id. at 2295.
74. McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 853, 359 (1922).
75. Id.
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"affect or imperil" adjoining public lands, Congress potentially has the power to supersede conflicting state laws in a
multitude of areas including mining, 6 water rights, and land
use regulation. While it is doubtful that there will be a rash
of Congressional Acts superseding state laws in these and
other fields, the possibility that Congress may possess such
constitutional power would constitute a serious encroachment
on traditional state sovereignty.
Historically, the Court has permitted expansion of Congressional power under the commerce clause to include regulation of activities only vaguely related to interstate commerce. 7 Should the Court permit a similar expansion of
federal power under the property clause, state authority to
enact general welfare laws pertaining to private lands adjoining public lands and private surface land over federallyowned minerals will be substantially curtailed.
In the case of the wild horses and burros, there was
evidence that state and local protection of the animals was
largely ineffective and a national system of management was
necessary.78 However, many forms of wildlife can be adequately managed and protected by state law and it would be
hoped that states would retain the power to regulate most
activities on adjoining private lands. Therefore, a definitive
Supreme Court ruling is needed to establish specific limits
76. In Herschler v. Kleppe, No. C76-108 (D. Wyo., filed June 9, 1976), the
governor of Wyoming is seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of
federal regulations, to the extent that they assert jurisdiction under the
Mineral Leasing Act [30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970)] and the Mineral
Leasing Act for Acquired Lands [30 U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1970)] to preclude the application of state law governing reclamation of mined lands
within Wyoming. See generally Alfers, Accommodation or Preemption?
State and Federal Control of Private Coal Lands in Wyoming, 12 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 73 (1977).
77. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942).
'78. Johnston, supra note 7, at 1063; But see Romero, Donkey Dilemma Damages
Public Land, High Country News, January 30, 1976, at 1, col. 4. This article
argues in favor of stricter burro control and reports that oversized burro
herds in California and New Mexico are causing detrimental effects to
vegetation and native wildlife populations. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (Supp.
IV, 1975) anticipates potential problems in this area and authorizes federal
management "carried out in consultation with the wildlife agency of the
State . . . in order to protect the natural ecological balance of all wildlife
species which inhabit such lands, particularly endangered wildlife species.
Any adjustments in forage allocations . . . shall take into consideration the
needs of other wildlife species which inhabit such lands."
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on the extent to which Congress can supersede state regulations pertaining to wildlife roaming on private and public
lands and general welfare activities conducted on adjoining
private lands.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kleppe v. New
Mexico marks an approval of increased federal control over
wildlife on public lands. The Court held that, under the
property clause, Congress has unlimited authority to determine what are "needful" rules "respecting" public lands, including the power to protect wild horses and burros as components of such lands. Since the states were unable or unwilling to provide effective protection, the Court's unanimous
decision should be applauded for guaranteeing that federal
legislation, essential to the animals' welfare, will remain in
force. The limits of Congressional power under the property
clause are undetermined, however, since the Court refrained
from deciding the constitutionality of the Act as it applies
to wild horses and burros on private land. It would seem
incongruous to withdraw federal protection from animals
usually occupying public lands during their occasional wanderings on private lands. Yet in deciding this question, the
Court should consider the possible erosion of states' police
power over game animals and other ferae naturae as a consequence of further expansion of federal control over wildlife.
The Kleppe decision also has significant implications
for determining the future scope of federal power under the
property clause in areas other than wildlife regulation. The
Court indicates that a federal statute can pass constitutional
muster under the property clause without being a land regulatory measure if Congress declares a relationship between
the subject matter of the statute and the system of public
lands. Application of this standard could justify a wide
variety of Congressional enactments serving a valuable purpose in matters where a national need is evident but also posing, in many instances, a major threat to the rights reserved
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss1/4
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to the several states. The Court also approved extending
Congressional power under the property clause beyond territorial limits in certain circumstances which may leave the
door open to a possible erosion of states' power to enact general welfare laws concerning private lands.
The Court has indicated a reluctance to permit a state
to obstruct Congressional intent, and in this case, a federal
management program was enacted largely because state protection of the wild horses and burros was unsuccessful. However, other wild animals and general welfare activities on
adjoining private lands can be equally well regulated by state
laws, and undoubtedly, in future decisions, the Supreme
Court will have to determine the fine line.
MARGARET ELIZABETH PLUMB
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